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ofIn 1972, nearly half a century after the 1925
Geneva Protocol banned the use of biological
weapons, international delegates began signing
the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
(BTWC), an international treaty that further
bans their development and possession, except
for “prophylactic, protective, or peaceful pur-
poses.” The BTWC was entered into force in
1975 and has since been ratified (or brought
into law) by 143 countries and signed (or pre-
liminarily agreed to) by an additional 18. 
But even as the BTWC established an
international agreement prohibiting biological weapons,
it did not contain the threat, which has persisted
through the years. The former Soviet Union, for exam-
ple, had a massive and secret biological weapons pro-
gram even as it vehemently denied allegations that it was
cheating on the treaty. Only in 1992 did then–Russian
Federation president Boris Yeltsin acknowledge the exis-
tence of the Soviet program, which is alleged to have
been subsequently dismantled. Iraq is known to have
developed biological weapons, and several Middle
Eastern and Arab countries, including Israel, Sudan, and
Algeria, have yet to sign the BTWC. Today
the U.S. Department of
Defense estimates at least 12 countries are
cheating on their treaty obligations. 
There currently is no system for monitor-
ing compliance among treaty members, a
“black hole” that many experts see as the
BTWC’s main shortcoming. “All the major
arms control treaties have international secre-
tariats that conduct inspections and mobilize
pressure on nations that create problems,”
says James F. Leonard, a former U.S. ambas-
sador to the United Nations Conference on
Disarmament who served as the BTWC’s
leading U.S. negotiator in 1972. “The BTWC has none of
this reinforcing machinery to back it up, and that’s where
it falls short.”
To  close the loopholes in the convention and make it
harder for countries to cheat, an ad hoc group formed in
1994 at a Special Conference of the state parties to the
BTWC was directed to “strengthen the effectiveness and
improve the implementation of the Convention . . . and
identify and examine potential verification measures.”
What the group finally produced after six years of delibera-
tion is a protocol—a document of a couple hundred pages
with an inspection regime at its core. The goal of
the protocol is to increase the BTWC’s 
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ceffectiveness, in part by creating a legally
binding framework for facility inspections. 
At a 25 July 2001 meeting of the ad hoc
group in Geneva, Switzerland, the United
States stunned the international community
when it became the only nation to reject the
protocol. U.S. rejection of the protocol had a
deep impact on stakeholders, some of whom
see the decision as evidence that the United
States is trying to kill the treaty altogether—
a charge that U.S. negotiators deny. 
On 19 November 2001, delegates con-
vened in Geneva to begin the Fifth Review
Conference of the state parties to the
BTWC, a meeting scheduled to last three
full weeks. Delegates will reaffirm the rules
of the BTWC and the comprehensiveness of
the prohibition, and supporters of
the protocol hope the issue of the
protocol will be decided once and for
all. “The BTWC is hanging in the
balance, and all eyes are on the
review conference now,” says
Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, chairper-
son of the Federation of American
Scientists’ Working Group on
Biological Weapons. “There are gov-
ernment officials out there who want
to wreck the treaty because they
don’t like the limitations it places on
the United States. Now is the time
to see if countries are going to do
anything to save the ban or if they’re
going to let it die.” No doubt, the
recent spread of anthrax cases since
11 September 2001 will provide an ominous
backdrop to the gathering, which occurs at a
critical moment in the BTWC’s history.
Delegates must answer many serious ques-
tions: Will they go ahead with the conven-
tion without the support of the United
States? Will they postpone deliberations on
the protocol? Or will they abandon the idea
of an inspections protocol altogether? 
The Mission and the Result
Three kinds of facility visits underlie the
protocol’s verification system. First are ran-
dom “confidence-building” visits to facili-
ties that declare possession of biological
agents of concern and/or heightened
biosafety capabilities. Inspectors worried
about anomalies, uncertainties, or data
omissions can proceed to a higher-level
clarification visit to address their suspicions.
If the clarification visit fails to resolve these
issues, a mandatory “challenge” visit is initi-
ated, with the duration and level of intensi-
ty left to the inspector’s discretion.
The U.S. position on visits has always
been marred by internal strife. On the one
side are those who say that data declara-
tions issued by facilities that could be used
for bioweapons purposes, together with a
corresponding inspection regime, offer the
best hope for deterring illicit activity. “In
the absence of such a system, any country
that wants to cheat on its obligations under
the BTWC is basically given a free ride—
they face very few impediments,” says Elisa
D. Harris, who coordinated U.S. policy on
biological weapons at the National Security
Council from 1993 to 2001 and is now a
research fellow at the University of
Maryland in College Park. 
On the other side are skeptics who
counter that visits provide little value and
pose unacceptable risks to U.S. economic
and national security, regardless of their fre-
quency. One of the main advocates for this
viewpoint is the chief U.S. representative to
the ad hoc group, Ambassador Donald
Mahley, who is special negotiator for chem-
ical and biological arms control issues at the
U.S. State Department. Mahley outlined
the U.S. position at the July meeting of the
ad hoc group. Biological weapons can’t be
monitored the same way their chemical and
nuclear counterparts are, he said. While
chemical plants have obvious infrastructure
requirements to manage toxic and corrosive
agents, biological weapons could be pre-
pared in any large-scale biology laboratory,
of which there likely are tens of thousands
in the United States alone. Meanwhile, he
said, intrusive facility inspections could
pose unacceptable risks to intellectual prop-
erty in the pharmaceutical and biotechnol-
ogy industries. Companies might have to
release proprietary samples and disclose
confidential technologies to prove their
own legitimate activities aren’t somehow
related to illicit weapons production. 
Mahley’s position is backed by a num-
ber of knowledgeable scientists in the field.
David Franz, deputy director of the Center
for Disaster Preparedness at the University
of Alabama in Birmingham, was chief
inspector during multiple United Nations
Special Commission biological weapons
missions in Iraq. He also served as a techni-
cal assistant for the Department of Defense
during the Biological Weapons Trilateral
Agreement inspections and negotiations in
the former Soviet Union. Based on his own
experience, Franz says any information
gleaned from on-site inspections is likely to
be unworthy of the fear and mistrust that
typically grows among those on either side of
the process. Suggesting that nations should
rely on cooperative personal relations among
scientists to deter treaty violations, Franz
says inspectors have no way to measure the
intent of facility operators to produce bio-
logical weapons. Furthermore, evidence of
illicit activity can be quickly destroyed or
removed, he says. This leaves him unwilling
to “offer anyone a clean bill of
health, knowing that shortly after
the inspection they could be doing
something else.”
Alan Zelicoff, a senior scientist
with the Center for National
Security and Arms Control at
Sandia National Laboratories in
Albuquerque, New Mexico, is also
skeptical that inspections can
enhance confidence in the treaty.
In 1996, Zelicoff headed up a series
of unpublished mock inspections
corresponding to the protocol’s
confidence-building, clarification,
and challenge visits at three differ-
ent locations in New Mexico. The
inspections were performed on
behalf of the Department of Energy. These
visits left him with the impression that confi-
dence-building and clarification visits are
“worse than worthless.” Explains Zelicoff,
“We actually found they undermine confi-
dence because there are so many ambiguous
indicators. For example, [standard laboratory
inhalation equipment] could be used as part
of an illegal offensive research program
under the BTWC, and there’s no way to dis-
prove that.” Ultimately, only challenge
investigations into specific allegations of use
had sufficient robustness to rule in or rule
out a violation. “With challenge visits you
might have a prayer of success if you ask pre-
cisely the right questions,” Zelicoff says. 
The U.S. Alternatives
Mahley spent much of October 2001 travel-
ing through Europe, holding meetings with
officials in London, Paris, Berlin, and
Brussels to drum up support for a set of U.S.
alternatives to the protocol. While U.S. offi-
cials refused to discuss specifics, sources say
the United States will likely present four pro-
posals at the November Review Conference.
Among them is a requirement that govern-
ments who sign the treaty must pass laws to
crimimalize violations by individuals and
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Present threat—and future? Recent outbreaks of anthrax (left)
cause many to wonder whether the United States should reconsider
its stance on the BTWC. Others wonder if smallpox (right) is next.make violators subject to extradition.
Additional measures include increasing
import/export controls on biological materi-
als, creating a global surveillance system to
track suspicious disease outbreaks, and
increasing the investigative authority of the
United Nations Secretary-General. 
Just how the international community
will respond to these alternatives remains to
be seen. Some of the more vociferous critics
of the U.S. stance insist that only an inspec-
tions regime—even one so limited relative to
the universe of weapons-capable facilities—
can provide assurances of treaty compliance.
“We need all the information we can get,”
says Rosenberg. “Even if it’s not perfect, it’s
better than nothing. The key thing is to con-
firm that a facility’s capabilities correspond
to what they publicly say they’re doing.” 
But other experts suggest the delegates
will defer discussion on the topic so that
U.S. proposals can be fully evaluated. One
who knows the details of the BTWC as well
as anyone is Graham Pearson, a visiting pro-
fessor in the Department of Peace Studies at
the University of Bradford in the United
Kingdom. Pearson, who until 1995 headed
the Chemical and Biological Defence
Establishment in the U.K. Ministry of
Defence, says that the November meeting is
“not the time for recrimination.” The more
important matter, he says, is to “reaffirm the
norms of the convention,” in part by
expanding the range of scientific advances
(for example, genetic technologies) covered
under the treaty. As far as the alternatives
go, Pearson says he’s “encouraged the
United States is coming out with some new
ideas.” In Pearson’s view, any of the alter-
natives proposed by the United States
could add incrementally to the BTWC’s
effectiveness, but in the final assessment,
an inspection regime would ultimately be
necessary to build transparency and confi-
dence in the treaty.
One difficulty likely to be faced by the
United States is suspicion over its own
domestic research activities. On 4 September
2001, The New York Times reported that the
United States had developed a large-scale
program of secret research on biological
weapons that “pushes [BTWC] limits.”
Article 1 of the BTWC bans biological
agents intended for hostile uses but permits
those used for “peaceful” purposes—a loop-
hole that allows countries to engage in pro-
tective research for national defense. 
The U.S. program, initially developed
under the Clinton administration, mimics
the steps a state or terrorist group might take
to create a biological arsenal, with the aim of
enabling the United States to better under-
stand the threat. Specific projects involve a
copy of a germ bomb, a germ factory made
of commercially available materials, and the
development of a more potent anthrax organ-
ism. The New York Times refers to adminis-
tration officials who claim that U.S. rejection
of the inspections protocol was based in part
on the need to keep these projects secret.
According to The New York Times, these
activities would “draw vociferous protests
from Washington if conducted by a state the
United States viewed as suspect.”
Another difficult issue for the United
States is its proposal to enhance international
legislation outlawing biological weapons
among BTWC nations. Apparently, this
U.S. proposal, which will be publicly
revealed for the first time at the November
conference, is based on draft language devel-
oped by Mathew Meselson, Thomas Dudley
Cabot Professor of Natural Sciences at
Harvard University and director of the
Harvard Sussex Program on Chemical and
Biological Weapons Armament and Arms
Limitation. Meselson’s language seeks to
strengthen Article 4 of the BTWC, which
merely “prohibits” these activities rather than
making them a crime. 
Of great concern to Meselson are reports
that the United States has modified his lan-
guage such that it refers specifically to
weapons of lethal intent. “Article 1 of the
convention doesn’t say anything about lethal
intent, only weapons intended for hostile
use,” he says. “To refer specifically to lethal
intent opens up a loophole that allows for
nonlethal but nonetheless hostile applica-
tions. I don’t think we want to open up this
Pandora’s box. The BTWC establishes a
norm that we do not use biological weapons
for hostile purposes, and that’s the way it
should remain. If they stick to this view, it’s
entirely in variance with the letter and the
spirit of the BTWC, and I don’t think it’s
going to fly.” 
Clearly, delegates have a lot on their
hands as they convene in the next few weeks.
The world has changed in the wake of
September 11—biological weapons are being
used in the United States right now. At the
same time, advances in biotechnology are
exploding, potentially leading to the creation
of genetically altered pathogens that could at
the very least change the face of public
health—or even alter the fate of the world.
Pearson says these combined pressures make
it imperative that the international commu-
nity reaffirm the relevance of the BTWC in
this new age. The events of September 11,
he says, should be seen as a wake-up call.
“The BTWC needs to be strengthened soon-
er than later,” he says, “and this review con-
ference should promote anything that can
take it forward.”
Charles W. Schmidt
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